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I. INTRODUCTION
ILICON Valley is said to be a "stock option culture" because the
high technology start-up companies rely so heavily on stock com-
pensation.' Start-up companies, it is said, need stock options to
motivate employees. 2 High technology companies have tenaciously de-
fended the accounting treatment of stock options that allows the compa-
nies to avoid reporting any compensation cost on their reports to
shareholders when stock options are used as compensation. 3 The "stock
option culture," it is said, is "taking over the country."'4 Almost all of the
largest publicly traded firms in the United States permit granting stock
options to executives, and in every industry surveyed, the median option
grant is larger than the salary for the Chief Executive Officer.5
Stock-based compensation, however, is a particularly expensive way
for the issuer to pay employees. For the issuer, stock is just a proxy for
the future cash that will need to be paid out on the stock. The issuer gets
credit for the future cash it will pay on stock only at its present value.
The discount rate used to compute the present value of cash paid out on
stock is brutal for the issuer, far higher than it would be with other forms
of compensation. The high discount rate means that the corporate em-
ployer gets no material credit for the cash that it has committed to the
employee and will eventually need to pay out on the stock. Using stock
as compensation undervalues the issuer's ultimate sacrifice.
Discount rates are so high on stock because stock prices are so volatile
and because the market distrusts managers. Shareholders are risk-averse
and volatility is a noxious characteristic for risk-averse shareholders.
Shareholders react to volatility unkindly by driving up the discount rate
used to value the future cash from the stock and driving down the value
of the stock. Shareholders, moreover, distrust managers to be loyal to
their interests so that they discount assets accumulated within the corpo-
ration at high discount rates.
For the issuer the resulting high discount rate on stock is brutal. Nox-
ious volatility from factors outside the firm is not a necessary part of com-
pensation. General market or industry-wide volatility can be filtered out
1. See Justin Fox, The Next Best Thing to Free Money, FORTUNE, July 7, 1997, at 52.
2. See Sen. Joseph i. Leiberman, But They Do Create Good Jobs, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8,
1994, at B7.
3. See, e.g., Stephen A. Zeff, The U.S. Senate Votes on Accounting for Employee
Stock Options, in READINGS & NOTES ON FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 507, 512 (Stephen A.
Zeff & Bala G. Dharan eds., 5th ed. 1997) (reporting a Vietnam-era-style demonstration
when hearings were conducted in San Jose, California, on a proposal to include stock op-
tions as a cost of compensation in reported company earnings); Christi Harlan, High Anxi-
ety: Accounting Proposal Stirs Unusual Uproar in Executive Suites, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7,
1994, at Al; Lee Berton, Accounting Rules Board is Under Fire as It Nears Decision on
Two Key Issues, WALL Sr. J., Apr. 6, 1993, at A2 (stating that outside criticism is rapidly
mounting and that survival of Financial Accounting Standards Board may be at stake).
4. Fox, supra note 1, at 52.
5. See M.A. Klein, Top Executive Compensation: 1995 Edition, (Conference Board
Report, 1995) (reporting that 87% of largest firms authorize executive stock option).
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of compensation if the parties use deferred cash plans, instead of stock
compensation. Managers can get more credit for future cash they will
pay out by increasing their credibility that the cash will in fact be
available.
Stock is more expensive for the issuer than other available alternative
ways to pay future cash, that is, debt and deferred compensation payable
in cash. The discount rate on debt-interest-is far lower for the issuer
than is the discount rate on stock. Tax deductions for interest on debt,
but not for distributions on stock, make debt even cheaper. In fact, the
average cost of interest, after tax and after inflation, has been negative,
over long periods of time. Negative interest means that the real cost of
compensation gets lower the more the compensation is deferred. Both
debt and deferred compensation increase the value that the employer
gets for its future cash, by increasing the issuer's credibility and lowering
the discount rate applied to stock.
Stock is often touted as a way to give capital gain to employees because
capital gain is taxed at lower rates than ordinary income compensation.
Giving capital gain to employees, however, is usually poor tax planning,
viewing employer and employee in aggregate. There is, for example, a
"nullification of capital gains" theorem, true within the range of "normal"
capital gains, that deferred cash compensation will give the employee an
after-tax benefit that is as good as having no tax on capital gain.
The trouble with stock compensation suggests that a conscientious
manager, trying to be fair and loyal to his firm and outside shareholders,
should avoid using stock and stock options as compensation. Stock com-
pensation is sometimes touted as aligning management with shareholder
interests. Stock, however, is just another way to hurt the shareholders
because it uses the most expensive format by which to pay management.
Stock-based compensation should not be favored by business norms, and
it should not be favored by the accounting, securities, and corporate law
provisions that attempt to civilize the self-interested behavior of
management.
Part II compares stock compensation with debt given as compensation
and argues that debt is cheaper than stock as a way to pay future cash to
employees. Part III compares stock compensation to deferred cash plans
and argues that deferred cash compensation is cheaper than stock. Cash
plans are also a superior incentive device. Part IV compares stock com-
pensation with current cash compensation.
II. STOCK COMPENSATION IS MORE EXPENSIVE THAN DEBT
A. STOCK IS A PROXY FOR FUTURE CASH
By issuing stock to an employee, the corporation has committed a frac-
tion of its future cash to the employee. 6 By issuing stock, the corporation
6. See, e.g., THOMAS COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND COR-
PORATE POLICY 21-22 (3d ed. 1988) (arguing that stock represents discounted present
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has not promised the employee to make any payments. Dividend distri-
butions or redemption of the stock cannot be compelled by a share-
holder. Under the business judgment rule, the courts delegate the
decision as to whether to distribute cash to shareholders to the discretion
of the board of directors. 7 Nonetheless, the basic rule is that dividends
and liquidation proceeds must be equal for all shares of the same class,
without preference or discrimination." A toddler learns early in day care
or with siblings to cry "share," and the cry works fairly well as a remedy
for shareholders too. By giving stock to employees, the corporation has
promised to share its future cash between old shareholders and the
employees.
A founder of a corporation who has given a new employee 10% of the
stock of the business has given up 10% of the residual cash of the busi-
ness. Employees receiving a stock bonus or buying stock under an option
cannot gain anything from their stock, except symmetrically by drawing
value away from existing shareholders. Stock has value only because it
produces cash.
Sometimes the effect of cash distributions on the value of stock is indi-
rect. The return that shareholders get from shares includes the proceeds
from sale of the shares to other investors. Accumulated earnings contrib-
ute to the sale price for stock, even though they are not distributions.
Both sale proceeds and value from accumulated earnings depend, in turn,
however, upon the present value of future cash distributions on the
shares.
1. Value from Sale Price
The subsequent sale price for a share of stock is nothing but the price
that a willing buyer will pay for it.9 A rational buyer pays no more for the
stock than the net present value of the cash that is expected after the sale.
If the present buyer is in turn relying on selling the stock to some further
value of cash distributions). See also Calvin H. Johnson, The Legitimacy of Basis from a
Corporation's Own Stock, 9 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 155 (1991) (arguing that fair market value
of stock represents a real cost to the issuer because it is net present value of future, nonde-
ductible cash).
7. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (holding that a
corporation may be forced to distribute dividends only upon compelling evidence that
management was ignoring shareholder interest); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 293 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that "in the absence of fraud, bad faith, gross overreach-
ing or abuse of discretion," courts will not interfere with corporate directors' business judg-
ment). For a debate over whether management discretion should be highlighted for
investors, compare Victor Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REV.
85 (1980) (arguing that given conflict of interests between management and shareholders,
disclosure of meaning of dividend decisions should be required) with Daniel R. Fischel,
The Law and Economics of Dividend Policy, 67 VA. L. REV. 699 (1981) (arguing that
market discipline is sufficient).
8. See 11 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPAEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS $ 5352 at 733-734 (1995); 18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations
§ 1220 (1985).
9. See, e.g., Werner F.M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: A Mean-Revert-
ing Walk Down Wall Street, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 189 (1989).
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buyer, that further buyer must still be relying on the present value of
subsequent cash flows. Some shareholders make money on "the greater
fool" theory by finding someone to buy the stock for more than the seller
paid without regard to present value of subsequent cash flows. But an
investor relying on the greater fool is already pretty far down the road to
foolishness. Buyers are usually self-protecting and rational and pay only
the present value of the cash flows expected to be distributed by the cor-
poration after the buyer's purchase. Ultimately, it is only the expectation
of cash distributions that gives any value to the shares.
2. Value from Accumulated Earnings
Stock is also commonly priced by looking to the earnings of the corpo-
ration, including earnings that are not distributed. Still, for accumulated
earnings to have value, the earnings must be like compound interest on a
bank account: leaving the interest on deposit, instead of withdrawing it,
must mean that the interest will earn interest. To have value, accumu-
lated earnings must increase the cash that is ultimately withdrawable. If
management is going to waste the accumulated earnings on bad invest-
ments or looting compensation, then the accumulations do not contribute
to share value. Thus, even growth stocks that are expected to give no
distributions for the foreseeable future have value only because accumu-
lations and the sale price are proxies for cash to be distributed in the
future.
Even unexpected increases in stock price after the corporation issues
stock as compensation represent a cost to the corporation. A broad mar-
ket such as the New York Stock Exchange is an efficient or "smart mar-
ket" in which bargaining between buyers and sellers reflects publicly
available information very quickly. 10 The future is ultimately unknow-
able, so that market price will not be correct. Market price, however, is
the best estimate of discounted present value of cash distributions
reached by parties bargaining at arm's length and using all available in-
formation to maximize their own self-interest. If the price of the issuer's
stock goes up by 40% unexpectedly, the smart market has determined
that the discounted present value of the future cash distributions has gone
up by 40%. Cash distributions are the ultimate cost of stock to the issuer,
however, and fair market value of the stock just reflects a new appraisal
of the issuer's real cost.
Much of the popularity of stock compensation seems to arise from a
fallacy that stock is cost free." The issuing corporation can print its own
stock, whereas it cannot print cash. "Dilution" does not seem to convey
the idea of cost to the issuer. Much of the cash that gives stock its value
will be paid long in the future; much of the cash will be paid out beyond
10. See e.g., Burton G. Malkiel, Is the Stock Market Efficient?, 243 SCIENCE 1313, 1317
(Mar. 10, 1989).




the time horizon that practical managers can see. In general accepted
accounting, stock options may be reported on income statements as if
they were free.' 2 Still, giving employees an option to buy stock of the
issuer is also just a proxy for future cash that will be issued if the option is
exercised. Issuing shares means that the corporation has to view itself as
committing cash to the new employee if the stock is worth anything at all.
Stock and stock compensation compete with other ways to pay employ-
ees with future cash, and the alternative means, debt and deferred com-
pensation, are cheaper.
B. COST COMPARED TO DEBT: THE EXTRAORDINARY PREMIUM
ON STOCK
1. Pretax Discount Rates
Investments in stock persistently have a higher return than investments
in corporate debt over a long period of time. According to data collected
by Ibbotson Associates, a dollar invested in long-term corporate bonds at
the end of 1925 until the end of 1997 would have given annual compound
interest of 2.6%, measured after inflation.' 3 A dollar invested in large
company stocks over the same period would have given an annual com-
pound return of 7.7%, measured after inflation.' 4
An extraordinary premium return to investors is symmetrically a brutal
cost to the issuer. Debt is extraordinarily cheap to an issuer and stock is
extraordinarily expensive. Assume, for instance, that a corporate em-
ployer gives a $1000 stock bonus to an employee, pays no dividends on
the stock and then redeems the stock back seventy-two years later after
the stock has grown in price by the average or 7.7% growth rate. The
corporation would need to pay $203,000 in cash to redeem the stock.
Stock is a very long lasting instrument for an issuer, so some very long
period is appropriate for evaluating stock. Long-term perspectives also
filter out or average out some accidental or temporary explanations. The
12. Current accounting rules allow a corporation to report stock options issued as
compensation as having no cost to the corporation if paid pursuant to an option had no
bargain when the stock amount and option price were set. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-
BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Financial Accounting Standard No. 123 J 26 (Finan-
cial Accounting Standards Bd. 1995) (allowing continuation of Accounting Principles
Board, opinion No. 25 10). For a criticism of the rule and discussion of accounting for
stock options, see Calvin H. Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 637, 643-648 (1997); Calvin H. Johnson, Stealing the Company with Free Stock Op-
tions: The Furor over Accounting Standards (pts. I & 2), 65 TAX NOTES 355 (1994), 65 TAX
NOTES 479 (1994); Calvin H. Johnson, Professor Johnson Replies to FASB, 65 TAX NOTES
1149 (1994).
13. A dollar invested at the end of 1925 would be worth $6.16. IBBOTSON AssocI-
ATES, STOCKS, BONDS, BILLS AND INFLATION 1998 YEARBOOK 104-05 (1998). Since $1 * (1
+ i)72 = 6.155, so i = ('6.155 ) - 1 = 2.56%. Any comparisons of long-term investments
need to be made in constant value dollars, from which inflation has been excluded, because
the buying power gives a dollar its real meaning.
14. A dollar invested in large company stocks over the same period would have grown
to $203.19 in constant dollars. See I BBOTSON ASSOCIATES, supra note 13, at 104-105. Since$1 * (1 + i)72 = 203.19, so i = ( " 203.19)-1 = 7.66%
[Vol. 52
STOCK COMPENSATION
$203,000 redemption price reflects just the average cost for large corpora-
tions in the Ibbotson sample.
Assume, by contrast, that the corporation gave a $1000 indebtedness to
the employee as a bonus, and that, like the stock, the issuer pays all the
cash, both principle and interest, at the end of the same seventy-two-year
term. 15 The 2.6% real growth of the debt, means that the debt bonus is
redeemed for $6155, in real constant-value-dollar terms. The $203,000
redemption price for the stock given as compensation is thirty-three-
times the $6155 cash redemption price for the debt given for the same
$1000 of compensation.
The return on stock can also be expressed in terms of how much credit
the employee will give to the corporation currently in return for the cor-
poration's future cash. Future cash on stock or debt gives fair market
value now to employees only because of the present value of the cash
reflected in the value of the instrument. A corporation paying the con-
stant-value-dollar amount of $1 in seventy-two years in the form of pay-
ment on debt will get credit for giving current compensation of sixteen
cents.' 6 A corporation paying the same dollar in the form of stock will
get current credit of only a near invisible value of half a cent. 17 Stock is
an undervalued form to pay cash in the future. For the corporation to get
any material current credit for the cash it will ultimately pay, it will need
to issue debt.
2. Tax Deduction for Interest
The disparity between the high discount rate on stock and the cheap
cost of debt is made even greater by tax. Interest on debt is deductible by
the issuer, but distributions on stock are not.18 The amount deductible on
15. Debt will not ordinarily have such a long term, but a corporation will have debt for
its full existence so that the corporation's debt will be renewed or replaced. The renewals
or replacements can be tacked together as a continuous single pool of debt, as if there were
only one debt.
16. $1/6.155 = $0.162.
17. $1/203 = $0.0049.
18. For interest to be deductible, the debt must be a bona fide debt for tax purposes,
payable without regard to the success or failure of the firm. A major economic test of
whether debt is bona fide is whether a third-party creditor would be willing to lend the
funds to the debtor-employer. See, e.g., Bauer v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1365, 1369-70
(9th Cir. 1985) (holding that debt was bona fide because an independent lender such as a
bank would be willing to make the loan); William T. Plumb Jr., The Federal Income Tax
Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L. REV. 369,
530 (1971) (arguing that independent creditor's willingness to lend is the acid test of eco-
nomic reality). Many start-up corporations cannot get loans from a bank or other third-
party creditors. Testing whether a loan is bona fide is, however, a multi-factor test and
some 32 factors have been identified as relevant. See id. Compensatory debt that is due
without contingencies and which the parties enforce on its terms is probably bona fide debt
if it is likely that payments can be made as due. There is, however, some tax risk of losing
the deduction for interest for those companies that are not in a position to borrow. A
finding that interest is not deductible will affect all of an issue and not just a marginal or
excess amount of interest on the issue, but compensatory debt is issued in relatively small
packages compared to total capital, and some compensatory debt might prove to be bona
fide when issued, even when subsequent issues lose the interest deduction.
1999]
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debt, moreover, is nominal interest, which includes an amount to offset
inflation. Deduction of the inflation element of interest is undoubted an
error, as a matter of reasonable tax policy. The inflation element of inter-
est is not a real cost to the debtor because it does not represent a reduc-
tion in cost-of-living terms. Inflation erases the burden of some of the
nominal interest paid because the debtor gains from being able to pay the
debt in cheaper, inflated dollars.19 In the 72 year period of the Ibbotson
sample, the nominal interest on long-term corporate debt has been
5.7%. 2o For much of the time of the Ibbotson data, the corporate tax rate
has been above or near 50%.21 A deduction of 5.7% nominal interest
with a 50% tax rate saves tax of 2.85%. When tax savings of 2.85%, aris-
ing from a deduction of nominal interest, are subtracted from the real
interest cost of 2.7%, the after-tax cost of interest is negative 0.15%.
Negative real interest rates have persisted for long periods of time,22
which indicates the phenomenon is not ephemeral.
Negative after-tax, after-inflation interest rates for the corporate em-
ployer mean the issuer has no cost for deferring costs, but rather a re-
ward. Compensation is cheaper for the employer the longer that
payment is deferred. The $1000 bonus to the employee shrinks in real
terms over time if the bonus is given as debt. Considering the negative
interest for the 72-year period of the model, the redemption price of a
$1000 bonus payable in debt is only $898.23 Considering the negative in-
terest, the $203,000 redemption price for the $1000 stock bonus is not just
thirty-three times more cash than debt, it is 226 times more expensive
than stock for the same $1000 value to the employee.
The higher redemption price for stock than for debt, in real terms, can
also be translated into a smaller present value for the future cash that the
corporation will pay. Stock requires a redemption payment that is 226
19. Including the inflation element within "interest" symmetrically means overtaxa-
tion of the creditor because the creditor is taxed on the "fool's profit" that just offsets the
losses due to the shrinkage of buying power of the dollar. See, e.g., Daniel Halperin &
Eugene Steuerle, Indexing the Tax System for Inflation, in UNEASY COMPROMISE:
PROBLEMS OF A HYBRID INCOME-CONSUMPTION TAX 347 (Henry J. Aaron et al. eds.,
1988).
20. See IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, supra note 13, at 102-105 (showing that 1925 dollar in
long-term corporate debt grew to $55.38 after 72 years). $1*(1 + i) = 55.38, where i =
5.73%.
21. See, e.g., JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 249 (5th ed. 1987) (showing
in detail that corporate rates were near or over 50% in World War 11 and from 1953-1986).
22. Interest rates do not even keep up with inflation, ignoring the tax effects. See, e.g.,
Martin D. D. Evans, Real Rates, Expected Inflation, and Inflation Risk Premia, 53 J. FIN.
187, 208 (1998) (explaining nominal interest's failure to keep up with inflation as indicating
monetary fallacy that ignores changing real value of money). See also Eugene F. Fama,
Term-Structure Forecasts of Interest Rates, Inflation, and Real Returns, 25 J. MONETARY
ECON. 59 (1990) (stating that interest rates do not meet changes in inflation); Martin Feld-
stein, Inflation, Income Taxes, and the Rate of Interest: A Theoretical Analysis, 66 AM.
ECON. REV. 809, 816 n.15 (1976) (finding increases in interest rate that just match the
increase of inflation, without regard to tax); Benjamin M. Friedman, Who Puts the Inflation
Premium into Nominal Interest Rates, 33 J. FIN. 833 (1978) (finding an increase in bond
yield of only 0.64% in response to a 1 % increase in expected inflation).
23. $1000 * [1 + i]2 = $1000 * I + (-.0015)]72 = $1000 * (.9985)72 = $897.55
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times more than the redemption payment for debt, given the assump-
tions, for the same $1000 bonus. So it follows that stock gives the corpo-
ration a current value per dollar that the corporation must pay out
eventually that is 226 times smaller than the credit the corporation will
get for a dollar paid in redemption of debt. Debt gives the corporation
more value for its money.
3. Higher Return Corporations
For the most successful companies, stock is even more expensive. The
cost of debt does not go up for more successful companies. If anything,
debt might drop below the average rate as a company proves its
creditworthiness. The cost of stock increases, however, with success of
the company. Small company stocks have given an average return of
9.3% per year in real terms over the seventy-two years of the Ibbotson
sample.24 The average small company, under the sample, would need to
redeem back its $1000 stock bonus for $613,000 in constant dollars, at the
end of the term, or 100 times the cost of the debt, and the small corpora-
tion is getting present value credit for only 1/613 of its future cash pay-
ment, or two-tenths of a penny per dollar paid.25 A corporation that does
even better than average, say 12% growth for the sample, will need to
pay back $3.5 million in cash at the end of the term.26
4. Current Conditions
Under current conditions real interest rates on debt are positive, after
tax, at least temporarily. From the end of 1994 to the end of 1997, corpo-
rate long term debt bore a real interest rate of 10.6%27 and a nominal
(deductible) interest rate of 13.4%.28 Corporate tax rates have now
dropped to 34-35%.29 At those newer values, the real after-tax, after-
inflation cost of interest is 5.9%.3o Interest after tax and after inflation is
not negative nor is it near zero. Debt, however, even though bearing
positive interest, remains extraordinarily cheap compared to stock. Over
the same period, large corporate stock has carried a time-value cost of
28%. The 28% yield implies redemption costs of $52 billion to redeem
the $1000 stock bonus, if current trends were to continue for 72 years.
Fifty-two billion to redeem a $1000 stock bonus is, of course, incredible,
but it cannot be dismissed in full. A successful corporation issuing stock
faces a meaningful risk of having the stock become very expensive.
24. See IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, supra note 13, at 104-105. $1 * (1 + i)71 = 613.46, so i =
(7N 613.46) - 1 = 9.32%.
25. $1/613 = $0.0016.
26. $1*(1.12)72 = $3,497,000.
27. See IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, supra note 13, at 105 (showing a 1925 dollar invested
in long-term bonds growing from $4.55 to $6.155 from the end of 1994 to the end of 1997 in
constant-value dollars). $4.55*(1 + j)3 = $6.155, where i = 10.6%.
28. See id. at 103 (showing a 1925 dollar invested in long term corporate bonds grow-
ing from $38.012 to $55.38 in nominal terms). $38.012*(1 + i)3 = $55.38, where i = 13.36%.
29. See I.R.C. § 11 (1998). Taxable income of over $10,000,000 is taxable at 35%.
30. 10.6% -(35%*13.4%) = 5.9%.
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The premium cost of stock is part of a larger puzzle, which is that cor-
porations in general seem to be relying too little on debt and too much on
stock. Debt carries risks from the issuer's side because creditors can
force payment, even if the payments force the corporation to sell core
assets and liquidate the business. The impact of creditor remedies, how-
ever, should not be overstated. 31 Rational creditors usually leave manag-
ers in place to salvage what they can from the assets, even in the case of
bankruptcy. Corporations, moreover, are artificial entities and even liq-
uidation or involuntary bankruptcy should not be confused with a life-
threatening event to an individual like starvation or physical injury. The
largest corporations, with the most net worth, have the least chance of
bankruptcy, and their considerable net worth after subtractions of liabili-
ties indicates that they are not using enough debt to reach equilibrium.
Most corporations stop using debt considerably short of the point where
more debt might entail a material risk of bankruptcy, and they stop con-
siderably short of the point where the value of the interest deduction
might be imperiled because the corporation has no taxable income. 32
Corporations should be issuing more debt overall, and less stock, includ-
ing for the purpose of compensating employees.
C. EXPLAINING THE EXTRAORDINARY COST OF STOCK
There are two plausible causes for the extraordinary discount rate on
stock, relative to debt. Both are avoidable with rational compensation
planning. Stock, first, is a lot more volatile than debt over short and me-
dium time horizons. Investors, including executives, need to insist on a
premium return to overcome their aversion to volatility. Stock, secondly,
plausibly carries a premium in order to overcome investor distrust of
management. Managers can divert undistributed funds to excess com-
pensation or less profitable projects and investors react by discounting
the future cash that the managers turn out in fact to make on the stock, at
premium rates. Both volatility and management distrust can be avoided
or reduced, however, in compensation planning. Issuers can avoid the
premium discount rate and get more credibility for their future cash by
switching over from stock compensation to debt or to deferred-cash com-
pensation instead.
1. Volatility
Over a short or medium time horizon, stocks are much more volatile an
31. Cf. William A. Klein, High-Yield ("Junk") Bonds as Investments and as Financial
Tools, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 505 (1997) (arguing that risks to issuers and investors of junk
bonds are overstated).
32. See, e.g., John R. Graham, How Big the Tax Benefits of Debt? PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 91 ST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAX HELD UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE NATIONAL
TAX ASSOCIATION (forthcoming 1999) (finding that corporations issue too little debt to be
explained by risks of bankruptcy or loss of tax-value).
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investment than debt.33 Holding stock tends to be like riding a roller
coaster with dramatic swings in prices. Most of the volatility arises from
factors outside the firm that executives can do nothing about.
Rational investors are risk-averse. Losses hurt an individual more than
symmetrical gains help. Losses cut into muscle, and then bone, because
they take away ever more desperately needed funds. Gains tend to add
fat on top of current levels of consumption or standards of living. Execu-
tives have mortgage and tuition payments to meet, and they maintain a
reasonably high standard of living that they would miss if compensation
were lost. Executives, like other investors, dislike risk. If two invest-
ments have the same average yield and one is volatile in value while the
other has a steady value, the volatile investment will be worth less. Inves-
tors also require a premium to overcome risk aversion as the volatility of
investments increase, even if the expected or average outcome remains
constant.
Most of the volatility of publicly traded stocks arises from factors which
executives cannot influence. Stock prices go up or down largely because
of market-wide or industry conditions that cannot be correlated with the
separate performance of the individual firm. It is said that an average of
80% of variation in stock price for an individual firm is correlated with
overall market movements or industry-wide price changes. 34 Only 20%
of the variation has something uniquely to do with the firm. To the extent
that stock behavior is independent of the firm, it is also independent of
the merits or control of the employee.
Making compensation benefit subject to stock price volatility, espe-
cially from causes outside the firm, adds an unnecessarily noxious factor
to a compensation plan. As a matter of physiology, animals given electric
shocks without being able to do anything about it show considerably
greater distress than do animals who think they can do something to
avoid the shocks. Executives who cannot affect the stock price are like
"executive monkeys," yoked to shocks they cannot avoid. 35 Even for cor-
porate employers with stock that is increasing overall, price volatility is a
33. For a discussion of the short-term very high volatility of stock see RICHARD A.
BREARLY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 148-160 (5th ed.
1996). See also IBBOTSON ASSOCIATES, supra note 13, at 112. See discussion accompany-
ing infra note 39 to the effect that for long term investment, with a time horizon of over 20
years, diversified investments in stocks tend to be less volatile than investments in debt.
34. See Jeffrey Kerr & Richard Bettis, Boards of Directors, Top Management Compen-
sation and Shareholder Returns, 30 ACAD. OF MGMT. J. 645, 659 (1987). See also, Richard
Roll, R2, 43 J. FIN. 541, 558 (1988) (noting that the Wall Street Journal's mention of a
company does not measurably affect that company's future stock price); See James J. An-
gel & Douglas McGabe, Market Adjustments for Executive Compensation at 19 ( forthcom-
ing 1999) (copy on file with SMU L. Rev.) (finding that 31% of variance of individual firm
stock is explained by variance of stock market as a whole).
35. See J.V. Brady, Ulcers in Executive Monkeys, 199 Sci. AM. 469 (1958) (finding that
monkeys who had no control over electric shock showed far higher physiological signs of
distress than monkeys who were trained to avoid the shock and thought they could avoid
shock); Gerald K. Weiss, et. al., The Effect of Two Different Types of Stress on Locus




noxious element. Executives would be better off with a more consistent
measure of their benefit, without regard to the level of their benefit.
Both executives and corporate employers would be better off without
the volatility of stock prices, independent of the amount of compensation.
Executives would be better off with a more consistent measure of their
benefit than stock prices provide. Without the risk, executives would not
need to demand the high discount rates that are applied to future cash to
be distributed on stock. With lower discount rates, the corporation would
get more present value for its future cash. At a minimum, it would yield a
more efficient form of compensation if stock price volatility that is in-
dependent of the firm, were filtered out of the compensation. 36 Even
lower discount rates would be achieved, for the benefit of the corporate
employer, if the corporation gave out debt as compensation instead of
stock. As noted above, after-tax discount rates on debt have been trivial
or slightly negative, on average over a long period of time.
Stock volatility alone does not explain the extraordinary discount rate
on stock. In a recent review of the literature, Professors Jeremy Siegal
and Richard Thaler showed that the premium on stock is far too high to
be explained by risk.37 To explain stock returns, an investor would have
to be so afraid of fluctuations that she would be willing to pay an insur-
ance premium of 49% of her wealth just to avoid a 50% chance of losing
half her wealth.38 That is too high a risk aversion to be plausible. The
puzzle is deepened, Siegel and Thaler explain, because over extended pe-
riods of time, debt becomes riskier than stock. In a twenty year time
horizon or beyond, Siegel and Thaler note, debt value is more volatile
than stock value. 39 Investors might also be afraid of catastrophic losses,
Siegel and Thaler allow, except that it is debt rather than stock that has
suffered the catastrophic losses in the past. Stock dropped precipitously,
for example, in the great stock market crash of 1929. Truly catastrophic
events, however, such as the German hyperinflation of the 1920s or the
Japanese hyperinflation after World War II, effected debt, not stock, and
wiped out the value of debt holdings altogether. Nothing in any stock
market has been as bad.41 Finally, Siegal and Thaler try to explain only
the pre-tax disparities in compensation due to differences between the
36. See Rick Antle & Abbie Smith, An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Per-
formance of Corporate Executives, 24 J. AccT. REs. (1986) (arguing that taking systematic
risk out of stock volatility reduces risk to executives).
37. See, e.g., Jeremy J. Siegel & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The Equity Premium
Puzzle, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1997, at 191; Narayana R. Kocherlakota, The Equity Pre-
mium: It's Still a Puzzle, 34 J. ECON. LITERATURE 452 (1996); Andrew B. Abel, The Equity
Premium Puzzle, Bus. REV.: FED. RES. BOARD OF PHILADELPHIA 3 (Sept./Oct. 1995). The
seminal article on the subject is Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Pre-
mium: A Puzzle, 15 J. MONETARY ECON. 145 (1985).
38. See Siegel & Thaler, supra note 37, at 192 (citing Mehra & Prescott, supra note 37).
39. See Siegel & Thaler, supra note 37, at 195. The volatility of a diversified stock
portfolio decreases as time goes by because fluctuations in the value of the portfolio tend
to offset each other. The volatility of debt, by contrast, increases over time because infla-
tion affects the value of the debt.
40. See id. at 194.
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returns on stock and on debt. After-tax disparities between the returns
on stock and on debt are even more extreme 4 and hence even less likely
to be explained fully by risk. Thus the extraordinary discount rate on
stock needs to be explained by factors in addition to volatility.
2. Agency Explanation
An additional factor that plausibly helps to explain the high discount
rate on corporate stock is investor distrust of management. In theory,
assets within a corporation are ultimately owned by shareholders, as if
the assets were part of the shareholder's wealth or bank account balance,
which are earning extra income for the shareholders. In the large corpo-
ration, however, managers control the assets that shareholders purport to
own, and shareholders cannot assume that management will use the as-
sets loyally to maximize shareholder value. The shareholder's primary
remedy giving value to corporate stock is that distributions must be made
pro rata to shares within the same class of stock. That remedy, however,
does not prevent management from withholding distributions and using
undistributed corporate wealth in ways that the shareholders do not par-
ticipate in, or making corporate investments that do not maximize share-
holder value.42
Management self-interest gets in the way of loyalty to the shareholders.
Management can and does pay itself excessive compensation.4 3 Manage-
ment can be, and often is, overindulgent in paying for office privileges
and perquisites.44 Management tends to receive higher compensation in
41. See discussion in text accompanying supra notes 18-22. See also Calvin H. John-
son, Equity Premium Puzzle, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1997, at 233.
42. The literature on conflict between management and shareholder interests of a cor-
poration goes back to ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN COR-
PORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1933) (stating that management tends to engage in
activities that are harmful to shareholders, such as excessive retention of earnings and ex-
ecutive compensation) and Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of The Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
43. Executive compensation is too high, whether judged by historical standards or by
the norms set by our trading partners and competitors. Graef Crystal points out, for in-
stance, that American chief executive officers are paid 120-150 times the average wages of
workers, whereas comparable Japanese CEOs are paid 16 times the wage of workers. As
late as 1974, the salary of American CEOs was only 35 times an average worker's wage. In
1990, the average salary for the CEO of a United States public company was $2.8 million
and the average for a CEO of Japanese company was $310,000 (about 1/9 of the U.S.
CEO's wage). See GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF ExCEss: THE OVERCOMPENSATION
OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 23-28 (1991). See also DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT:
How EXECUTIVES AND PROFESSIONALS ARE PAID AND How IT AFFECTS AMERICA 95,297(1993) (doubting that mind-numbing levels of executive pay properly allocate talent in a
manner that corresponds to America's needs and goals); George F. Will, Ripping Off Capi-
talism, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1991, at C7 (claiming that "ludicrous" CEO salaries are some-
times "looting"); Peter F. Drucker, Is Executive Pay Excessive?, WALL ST. J., May 23, 1977,
at A-20 (proposing to limit CEO pay to 20 times worker's pay).
44. For a wonderful illustration, see Bernie Shellum, Fruehauf Steers into Trouble:
Management Cited in Decline of Truckmaker, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 27, 1989, at C1 (reprinted in
Ronald Gilson & Bernard Black, THE LAW & FINANCE OF CORP. ACQUISITIONS 363 (2d
ed. 1995) (reporting that management destroyed historical industry leader with extrava-
gant extras and golf)).
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larger corporations, so management tends to hold on to earnings to make
the corporation larger, even when distribution of the earnings would im-
prove shareholder wealth. 45 Management has a bias in favor of plowing
earnings back into the industry with which they are familiar, even if that
is not the best available investment, because that increases management
competence and security. 46
Shareholder remedies are too weak to prevent managers from paying
themselves too much or from making sub-optimal investments. In large
corporations, there are too many shareholders with too little at stake to
make it worth the considerable cost of testing the quality of management.
Independent shareholders do not know how to improve the business or
investment judgment of their managers, nor do they know how to im-
prove management business performance. Even if they did know, their
small stake would not make it worthwhile to undertake a campaign to
replace management. In large corporations, shareholders are owners
only in theory, and in reality management appoints the board of direc-
tors. In the modern, publicly held corporation, shareholder votes and
other remedies are not strong enough to ensure that managers are loyal
to the shareholders. 47
Shareholders respond to the weakness of their control over their agent
managers by discounting the price they are willing to pay for their shares
on the market. A discount rate for future cash, reflected in the extraordi-
nary premium return on stock, is mathematically equivalent to a low
price paid for the stock. Given the extent of management's ability to loot
the corporation or to make bad investments, outside shareholders with no
reliable information or control are forced to assume that the shares are
45. See, e.g., Joseph W. McGuire et al., Executive Incomes, Sales and Profits, 52 Am.
ECON. REV. 753, 760 (1962) (finding that executive compensation increases as gross re-
ceipts increase); HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 37 (1996) (arguing
that management opportunism works most easily by excessive retention of earnings).
46. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: Firm
Specific Investment, 23 J. OF FIN. ECON. 123 (1989) (arguing that management plausibly
makes investments in area of their expertise to make themselves indispensible).
47. Some have argued that the hostile takeover is the best current remedy for manag-
ers who loot the corporation or make sub-optimal investments. An outside raider will be
able to offer a price for shares higher than the current stock price because the raider is
confident that he can improve the return on the target's assets simply by replacing current
management and making better use of corporate resources. See Henry Manne, Mergers
and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110, 113 (1965); Ronald J. Gilson,
A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Of-
fers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 841 (1981). The takeover remedy may lead to local improve-
ment, however, while making the global situation much worse. Takeovers make
corporations larger, and larger corporations are even less responsive to shareholders than
smaller corporations. Managers of larger corporations have a more protected position
from which to loot the corporation via excessive salaries and bad investments because it is
harder to organize shareholders or take over the corporation the larger the corporation
grows. Cf Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Value Maximization and the Acquisition
Process, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 7, 15 (1998) (arguing that takeover of other companies at in-




"lemons." '48 The low price that the market places on shares is the re-
venge that shareholders visit upon the corporation for the self-interested
behavior of its management.
The best evidence that the high discount rates on stock are caused, at
least in part, by distrust of management is that management can increase
the stock price by paying out more dividends, even though dividends are
not the best option from a tax planning perspective. As a matter of tax
alone, dividends hurt individual shareholders and should reduce the price
of stock. Dividends are ordinary income, currently taxed at rates as high
as 44%.49 Accumulated earnings are capital gains to the shareholders,
taxed only if there is a sale before death and bearing a tax of from zero to
20%.50 For much of the seventy-two year sample, dividends have been
taxed at 50% to 70%. Shifting from zero to 70% tax for corporate earn-
ings by paying a dividend should reduce the value of the earnings by over
three times, to 30% of pre-dividend value.
Nonetheless, the non-tax value of dividends, in overcoming the agency
problems with accumulated earnings, more than offsets the considerable
tax effect. Dividends give the shareholders a "bird in the hand." The
earnings of the corporation are then no longer subject to management
looting. Management usually claims that the corporation's stock is un-
dervalued-much as grandparents claim the beauty of their grandchil-
dren-but dividends are more credible to shareholders than managers'
words. Dividends give shareholders control of the money and provide
credible evidence that the corporation is prospering. Reducing the dis-
48. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons:" Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (arguing that markets are destroyed when buyers
have inaccurate information because they have to underbid for assets on the assumption
that the asset is as bad as it could be); Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational
Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN 371 (1977) (argu-
ing that information asymmetry will drive down the price of stock and prevent a corpora-
tion from using stock to fund projects with positive value); P.K. Chauncey & C.M. Lewis,
Earnings Management and Economic Information, 1 J. CORP. FIN. 319 (1995) (applying the
"lemons" argument to share valuation under bad accounting information).
49. See I.R.C. § I (a)-(d) (1998). The statute provides for tax rates on individuals of up
to 39.6% while I.R.C. §§ 68, 151(d)(3) add complicated "phase out" surcharges that bring
the marginal tax rate up to 44%, for a family of husband and wife and two children. See
Calvin H. Johnson, Simplification: Replace the Personal Exemptions Phaseout Bubble, 77
TAx NOTES 1403, 1404 (1997). The largest phase-out tax, for personal exemptions, typi-
cally lasts from $187,00 to $309,000 of taxable income and tax rates drop down to 41% for
incomes above the phase-out range. See Rev. Proc. 97-57, 1997-52 I.R.B. 20.
50. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(E), 1222(3), (11) (1998). The statutes provide for a maxi-
mum tax of 20% on "capital gain." "Capital gain" arises because the corporation accumu-
lates its earnings, rather than distributing them as dividends, or because the future
prospects of the corporation turn out to be better than expected. Capital gain that accrues,
but is not realized or taxed before the death of the owner of the shares is never taxed. See
I.R.C. § 1014 (1998) (providing that the basis of property acquired from decedent is the
fair market value at the date of death, rather than decedent's cost). The combination of
low nominal rate, deferral of imposition of tax until sale and forgiveness of tax upon death
typically reduce the expected tax rate on capital gains to under 10%. See Calvin H. John-
son, The Undertaxation of Holding Gains, 55 TAX NOTES 807 (1992).
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trust overcomes the tax effect.5 ' Dividends reduce investor distrust
enough to overcome the tax effects, so that dividends do not reduce the
value of the stock overall5 2 and can actually increases the value of the
stock on the market!5 3 The price increase for corporate action that in-
creases shareholder tax is the best evidence that distrust of management
causes the extraordinary stock premiums.
Consistently, increasing the firm's debt increases the value of the firm,
although for debt the cause is more ambiguous. Debt provides a credible
promise by management to pay interest as it is due, replacing the less
credible rules for distributions on stock. Debt forces management to dis-
tribute cash as the interest and principal of the debt become due. Fur-
ther, debt provides a credible signal that the firm is not worried about
bankruptcy and is willing to go to the capital market. Increasing the ratio
of debt to equity in the corporation increases the value of the
corporation.5 4
For debt, the increase in share value, caused by more debt, cannot be
unambiguously attributed to an increase in management credibility be-
cause tax effects might also explain why increasing debt increases share
value. For short-term investments, more debt might increase the value;
considering only the tax, but for very long-term investments by share-
51. See Morton H. Miller & Kevin Rock, Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Informa-
tion, 40 J. FIN. 1031 (1985) (arguing that corporations need to make dividends to signal
success even if that means that they forego opportunities with positive value); Andrei
Shlcifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997);
Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and the "Bird in the Hand"
Fallacy, 10 BELL J. ECON. 259 (1979) (arguing that tax cost to dividends make the signaling
effect credible); Larry H.P. Lang & Robert H. Litzenberger, Dividend Announcements:
Cash Flow Signaling vs. Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 181-91 (Nov.-Sept.
1989).
52. See Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, T7xes, Finance Decisions, and Firm
Value, 53 J. FIN. 819 (1998) (showing the positive value that dividends serve by giving
reliable information completely masks the tax effect, so that there is no hint of tax reducing
value). Cf Kathryn L. Dewenter & Vincent A. Warther, Dividends, Asymmetric Informa-
lion, and Agency Conflicts: Evidence fron a Comparison of the Dividend Policies of Japa-
nese and U.S. Firms, 53 J. FIN. 879 (1998). (Japanese firms face less need to distribute
dividends to provide creditable information to owners because Japanese firms have closer
ties to creditors and owners).
53. See Paul Asquith & David W. Mullins, Jr., The Impact of Initiating Dividend Pay-
mnents oi Shareholders' Wealth, 56 J. Bus. 77 (1983) (showing that announcements of in-
creased dividends increase stock price); Kose John & Joseph Williams, Dividends, Dilution,
and Taxes: A Signalling Equilibrium, 40 J. FIN. 1053 (1985) (showing that announcing a
dividend will increase the value of stock). See also Tom Nohel & Vefa Tarhan, Share Re-
purchases and Firm Performance: Newv Evidence on the Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, 49
J. FIN. ECON. 187 (1998) (showing that stock repurchases increase share value, not by sig-
naling greater performance, but by disgorging cash that the corporation can not profitably
invest).
54. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and
Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986) (arguing that increasing leverage increases the
value of stock by forcing management to disgorge cash to shareholders if they do not have
corporate investments that improve net present value of the firm); JAMES C. VAN HORNE,
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 285 (10th ed. 1995) (stating that debt increases the
value of the firm by signaling that managers do not fear bankruptcy); Stephen A. Ross, The
Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach, 8 BELL J. ECON.
23 (1977) (finding that value increases as debt increases).
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holders, under current tax rates, less debt would increase the value of the
firm. 55 Given that more debt might improve value for tax purposes, an
increase in value of the firm when debt increases cannot be unambigu-
ously attributed to a decrease in distrust of management. The data, how-
ever, is consistent with the theory that shareholder mistrust depresses the
value of stock.
The agency theory for high discount rates on stock plausibly explains
why stock does not reach equilibrium with debt and why issuers do not
replace high-cost stock with other forms of paying compensation. Man-
agement could increase the value of shareholder interests by issuing debt
or dividends, but debt or dividends would reduce the accumulated earn-
ings under management control. Management often wants to retain earn-
ings to feather its own nest. Management also wants to pay for its
perquisites and excessive compensation and make self-aggrandizing in-
vestments. Stock is a very expensive way for the issuer to pay cash and
remains more expensive than debt, but management is disloyal to the is-
suer. To reach an equilibrium between debt and stock, management
would have to work in favor of shareholder interests and against its own
interests.
The theory that stock is undervalued because the corporation pays out
more cash than shareholders can reliably predict beforehand implies that
management can make matters worse by reducing the quality of informa-
tion given out to shareholders. Compensatory stock options given to
management, for example, are not reported as part of the earnings re-
ported to shareholders. 56 Shareholders get revenge for vague and mis-
leading accounting by increasing the discount rate reflected in the price
for the stock. Obfuscation and dishonesty reduce the value of stock.
Countries that do not provide outside investors with significant informa-
tion do not have public markets from which firms can raise money.57 The
costs of lying or providing vague information to the market may be dif-
55. Assume that a corporation is considering whether to buy back $1000 of stock in
return for $1000 of debt from a shareholder who has just purchased the stock who and can,
therefore, sell it back without taxable gain. Assume also that the corporation will redeem
the debt (or stock) in year n. The shareholder should sell the stock, increasing the corpora-
tion's debt, if debt gives a higher terminal value at n and should hold the stock if stock
gives a higher terminal value at n. The terminal position with debt is $1000* [1 + I*(1-TI]n
where T, is the shareholder's tax rate, and I is the interest rate. The terminal position with
stock, assuming accumulation of all earnings and a capital-gain redemption at the end, is
$1000 * [1 + R * (l-Tc]" * (1-cg)] + cg * $1000, where R is the return to the corporation, T,
is the corporate tax rate, and cg is capital gains tax rate. The final "cg*$1000" term reflects
the fact that the basis is subtracted to compute gain and is not subject to capital gains tax.
See MYRON S. SCHOLES & MARK A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLAN-
NING APPROACH 57-58 (1992). With I = R = 10%, cg = 20%, T, = 35%, Ts = 44%, the
break-even n is in the forty-fifth year, so with n < 45 years, debt is more valuable. If n > 45
years or if capital gain drops down to zero because of death, then stock is more valuable
for the highest taxed individual.
56. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 12.
57. See, Johnson, Accounting in Favor of Investors, supra note 12, at 638 (arguing that
countries that do not provide outside investors with accurate information do not allow
companies to raise significant capital from public markets): Shleifer & Vishny, supra note
51, at 5 (discussing countries where capital markets are well-developed and poorly devel-
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fused to all firms, while the benefit of the lie may rebound to the scoun-
drel. Still, anything that decreases firm credibility increases the discounts
reflected in their shares.
In sum, debt is cheaper for the issuer in part because the corporate
obligation with debt is more credible. When after-inflation and after-tax
discount rates are near zero, as they have been over long periods of time,
the market will not discount the future dollar the employer pays by any
material amount to determine present value. By contrast, when the cor-
poration gives cash by way of stock the market insists that the corpora-
tion pay out 7.7% after inflation because the expectation of cash is less
reliable. The present value of the cash payable in 72 years shrinks to a
trivial level of one-half of a cent for every dollar the corporation ulti-
mately pays.58 The market value gives the corporate issuer too little
credit for the real value of cash it will ultimately pay on stock.
III. STOCK COMPENSATION IS MORE EXPENSIVE THAN
CASH DEFERRED COMPENSATION
Stock also competes with deferred compensation payable in cash as an
alternative way to pay future cash. Deferred compensation is almost al-
ways the better alternative. Stock is often touted as a way to give man-
agement proper incentives, but cash plans are flexible and can avoid the
incentive distortions inherent in stock and stock options. Cash is also
cheaper than stock, for the same amount of future cash, because deferred
compensation can increase the issuer's credibility and decrease the is-
suer's discount rate. Finally, stock is often touted as a way to give em-
ployees capital gain, but there is a tax theorem, with wide applicability,
that deferred cash compensation gives the employee the same after-tax
benefit as if there were no tax on capital gain.
A. INCENTIVES
Stock compensation is said to be useful as an incentive device to align
an executive's self interest with the interests of the shareholders. If man-
agement has a meaningful percentage of total corporate equity, then that
is said to provide a "direct and powerful 'feedback effect." 59 Some say
that with stock compensation, executive incentives and shareholder inter-
ests will converge. 60 Moreover, if top managers are willing to invest in
the corporation or corporate projects with their own money, that sends a
oped because of protection of outside investors). See also, Akerlof, supra note 48, at 488
(arguing that there is economic cost to dishonesty).
58. See text accompanying supra notes 14-23 for a more complete explanation of this
model and assumptions.
59. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You
Pay, But How, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at 138, 141.
60. See Mark J. Loewenstein, Reflections on Executive Compensation and a Modest
Proposal for (Further) Reform, 50 SMU L. REV. 201, 206 (1996).
[Vol. 52
STOCK COMPENSATION
powerful signal to the market that the corporation is a good investment. 61
Stock compensation, however, turns out to be a very poor instrument
to give management the proper incentives. The incentives are ineffective,
go awry, or are delivered inefficiently. Anything stock can do cash can do
better.
1. Drawbacks of Stock as an Incentive Device
Stock cannot ensure management loyalty to shareholders, first, because
management can own only a fraction of the stock. Assume, for example,
that a chief executive officer (CEO) owns 5% of the stock of a publicly
owned corporation, which is a very high percentage under current
norms. 62 The stock ownership would be insufficient to prevent the CEO
from being disloyal to shareholders when there is a direct conflict be-
tween the CEO's and the shareholder's interests. Assume, for example,
that the CEO is considering paying herself excessive compensation. The
CEO gets 100% of the excessive compensation in her role as recipient of
the compensation. She loses 5% of the payments in her role as share-
holder of the corporate employer. For every dollar of excess compensa-
tion she pays herself, she is ninety-five cents ahead. There may be some
fringe benefits and perquisites of office that give the CEO a value of less
than five cents per dollar of corporate cost. For those, her ownership of
stock would make her realize that such a perquisite was not a free lunch
and she would stop it. The limitation, however, is not very important at
the level of ownership that managers of public corporations have. If, for
instance, a perquisite of office gives six cents of value per dollar of corpo-
rate cost, she would be better off with the perquisite than without it, even
given the damage to her share value. A manager of a publicly held cor-
poration cannot own 100% of the shares, by definition, and so her share-
holdings cannot prevent self-interested behavior that hurts the value of
those shareholdings. Relying on shareholdings to control management
misbehavior provides false security.
Large stock holdings can distort incentives, for instance, by making
management too conservative. Rational shareholders usually want man-
agement to ignore the risks to the business that the shareholders can
avoid by diversification. 63 Rational investors diversify their portfolios be-
cause many of the risks of any particular stock are firm-specific and can
be offset by fluctuations in other investments that move, as sine and co-
sine curves do, so as to cancel out the risks. A shareholder can blithely
61. See Leland & Pyle, supra note 48, at 372 (arguing that the best signaling by manag-
ers is their willingness to undertake investments in their firm's projects with their own
money).
62. See Clifford Holderness, Were the Good Old Days that Good? Changes in Mana-
gerial Stock Ownership Since the Great Depression, NBER WORKING PAPERS No. 65501 at
9 (1998) (reporting that the top corporate officer holds an average of 1.25% of corpora-
tion's stock and that the percentage has been steady since the data series began in 1935).
63. See, e.g., Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Invest-
ment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 319-320 (1990); Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 624 (1989).
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disregard diversifiable risks. For example, if only one of three companies
will get a big contract, an investor can avoid bearing the damage from
loss of the contract by owning stock of all three companies. Large block
holdings by management, however, are too big for the firm-specific losses
to be diversified away. Management will then avoid the firm-specific
risks that would have been avoided by diversification even for invest-
ments with an expected positive value because the loss hurts them too
much if it happens. Management already tends to be too conservative
because their livelihood is invested in the firm and cannot easily move to
another company. Large stock holdings push management to be even
more conservative. 64
Stock performance is also an inferior incentive for good performance
by an executive because stock price has a high level of volatility that an
executive cannot control. It has been estimated, as noted, that 80% of
the volatility of stock prices arise from forces that are not individual to
the firm. Volatility from factors outside of the firm add random shocks to
compensation, punishing the just and rewarding the incompetent. With
stock-based compensation, incompetent or disloyal managers will profit
from a rise in stock price that he or she did not affect. Capable and loyal
managers will be hurt if the stock price declines for reasons that have
nothing to do with their performance.
2. Stock Option Distortions
Giving stock options to management is one of the most popular forms
of stock compensation because the employer's cost of compensation does
not have to be reported on public financial statements. 65 Stock options,
however, create truly bizarre incentives for management to squelch divi-
dends and seek out risk, even though it damages shareholder wealth.
Stock options give management an incentive to accumulate earnings
rather than distribute them because accumulated earnings increase the
value of stock options by increasing the value of the stock and the bargain
that the option holder will achieve. Stock options do not, however, par-
ticipate in dividends. Stock options encourage management to go into
very high risk investments that have negative expected value because the
holder of an option participates in the gains in value, but not the losses.
Assume, for example, a model with the following facts: The chief exec-
utive officer and top management of Widget Corp. have options to
purchase 5% of Widget stock at the current fair market value one year
hence. Widget's net assets are worth $100 million and Widget has no
debt. Widget Corp. has an opportunity to go into a start-up business by
investing its $100 million worth of assets. The new opportunity has a 10%
chance of being worth $900 million after one year and a 90% chance of
being worth nothing. Generally, available no-risk investments give a re-
turn of 6%. The opportunity has a negative expected value because the
64. See Hu, supra note 63, at 327-329.
65. See Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation, supra note 12.
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10% chance of making $900 is worth $90 million and $90 million dis-
counted by one year at 6% is $84.9 million. Investing $100 million for an
expected return of $84.9 million is a losing strategy from the shareholder
point of view.
The high-risk, 90%-failure, negative-expected value start-up business is
rational from the managers' private point of view, however, even though
it hurts shareholders, because the managers hold stock options. Manag-
ers do not participate in the shareholder's loss in the 90% of the time that
the start-up fails. If the start-up fails, they just fail to exercise their option
so that they have neither gain nor loss. In 10% of the cases in which the
start-up succeeds, however, an option for all of the stock (exercisable at
current fair market value) will be worth ($900 million-$100 million.) *
10%/(1+6%) or $75.47 million. Management has the option of acquiring
only 5% of the corporation. Their options will thus be worth only 5% of
the $75.47 million. Still, management gets positive value from its stock
options if the investment made, making the risky start-up investment ben-
eficial to management considering only their own selfish position.
Now assume that the corporation has earnings of $10 million, which
can either be distributed as a dividend or invested internally in a project
worth only $8.49 million. With loyalty to the shareholders, management
would distribute the $10 million now, rather than the $8.49 million when
the project is complete. Management with stock option, however, will get
no value reflected in their option if the $10 million is distributed immedi-
ately. If they follow their self interest, they will accumulate the money in
derogation of the shareholder's interests.
Stock option plans are also usually too rigid even to be adapted to
measures of executive performance. Stock option plans that rely on
avoiding treating the option as a cost in published financial statements,
for instance, must fix the exercise price of the option and the number of
shares at the time the option rights are granted. 66 If either exercise price
or shares subject to the option are changed, that creates a new measure-
ment date. If the stock has appreciated since the option was granted, that
means that the employer will not have a zero reported cost for the com-
pensatory option, but rather a cost measured by the difference between
the value of the stock and exercise price as of the new measurement date.
The employer can then no longer rely on the absence of a bargain on the
option using the fair market value of the stock when the option was origi-
nally granted. In order to avoid reports to shareholders of the compensa-
tion cost of a stock option, the corporation must bind itself in ways that
can get in the way of optimal compensation design.
In the abstract, it might be possible to use stock and stock options as
part of a mix to create incentives for management that perfectly offset the
other biases of management. 67 Cash plans, however, give the employer
66. See ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 12, 1 5 (allowing
continuation of Accounting Principles Board No. 25, 10b).
67. See Hu, supra note 63, at 325 n.126.
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the flexibility that a fixed exercise price and fixed amount of stock do not
have, making it easier to create the optimal incentives.
3. Incentives with Deferred Payment of Cash
Any incentives for the employee that stock compensation provides can
be duplicated and improved with a cash plan. If employees are paid cash
under a deferred compensation agreement, the contingencies for paying
cash can be set with flexibility and intelligence. A cash deferred compen-
sation plan could mimic the rewards of stock compensation if that were
helpful. "Phantom Stock" and "Stock Appreciation Rights," for instance,
are plans that pay the employee cash for the increase in the price of the
employer's stock as if the employee owned the shares for some period of
time. 68 The employee is given units of his employer's stock, purely on
paper, and gets paid the appreciation in value of those shares in cash,
without ever becoming a real shareholder or having to come up with the
capital for the initial purchase price. If measuring appreciation by stock
value were a virtue, then a cash plan could capture the virtue without
committing the employer to the extraordinary cash, discounted at ex-
traordinary rates, that a stock issue requires. Cash distributed from
Phantom Stock plans, moreover, may be deducted for tax purposes; dis-
tributions of the same amount of cash to the employee on real stock may
not be deducted for tax purposes.
Customizing a cash deferred compensation plan can cure some of the
faults of stock compensation even if stock performance is the core under-
lying idea. Phantom Stock, which pays management when dividends are
paid, is better than Stock Appreciation Rights in reducing management's
incentive to retain corporate earnings. A cash deferred compensation
plan can screen out some of the factors over which the employee has no
possible control. The contingency for payout could, for example, have
subtracted from it a general index of all stocks on the stock market so
that economic conditions affecting the whole stock market would not af-
fect compensation. 69 For that matter, once the parties understand the
flexibility, employees might be paid upon contingencies that are more re-
sponsive than overall stock prices to employee production or merit. A
division chief, for example, might be rewarded under an internal control
system that better describes the performance of the division than do com-
pany-wide earnings or overall corporate stock performance.
68. See, e.g., Phantom Stock Not a Second Class of Stock, 78 TAX NOTES 431 (1998)(describing I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 9803023 as saying that phantom stock is not in-
cluded in employee's income until paid); James Hamill, Nonqualified Stock Plans Can Be
Adapted to Meet the Needs of Privately Held Companies, 82 J. TAX. 100 (1995). 'Stock
Appreciation Rights' tend to give the employee only the value of the increase in price of
shares. 'Phantom Stock' tends to give the employee cash as well when dividends are paid
on the real stock. Id.
69. See Angel & McGabe, supra note 34, at 19 (arguing that general market volatility
needs to be filtered out of executive compensation measures).
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One of the benefits of stock for the employee is that the employer is
pre-committed to giving the employee the future gain on the stock and
future cash flows on the stock. With discretionary bonuses awarded after
employee performance, the employee properly fears that the employer
can behave tactically and pay the employee less than she was expecting.
A pre-commitment would assure the employee that effective work will be
rewarded. Deferred cash compensation, however, can be pre-committed
to the employee with a clear, objective set of conditions for payout. Any-
thing that stock can do, cash can do better.
Cash compensation, moreover, forces the employee to evaluate the
cost of the compensation. Plans that pay out cash at the end may not be
treated as cost-free for financial accounting purposes, even if they mimic
stock option plans. As compensation is earned by the employee, it is ac-
crued as an expense by the employer.70 If the employer budgets inter-
nally from accounting books that include the compensation, the cost to
the employer will be understood-perhaps the move to cash plans will
force the employer to understand the cost of the compensation for the
first time. Once understood, cost can be controlled and shaped to do the
most good per dollar spent. There seems to be a fallacy that stock is free
to the employer-that the employer prints its own stock.71 Everyone,
however, understands the cost of real cash. Understanding the real cost
of compensation is the first step to getting the cost under control.
B. REDUCING THE Discour RATE
Deferred compensation should be cheaper than stock for giving any
benefit to an employee, because deferred compensation can drop the dis-
count rate at which the employee evaluates the value of the future cash
without dropping the discount rate which the employer uses to evaluate
its cost. For a corporation that can make good profits from its business
activities, there is an asymmetry of discount rates available under which
the employee values the future cash highly, in present value terms,
whereas the employer finds it very cheap to fund, in present value terms.
1. The Value of an Enforceable Promise
Switching from stock compensation to deferred cash will make com-
pensation more efficient by reducing the discount rate recipients use to
discount cash that will be paid in the future. Deferred compensation
plans represent a promise to pay the employee, which the employee may
enforce in a court of law. The promise of cash is more credible for the
employee. Stock entails no promise to pay at any time, and the share-
holder may not force payments or prevent self-interested management
behavior as to accumulated earnings. Deferred compensation may be
70. See, e.g., ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION, supra note 12, 25
(stating that corporations accrue cost of a Phantom Stock plan according to fair market
value of stock at end of accounting period).
71. See text accompanying supra note 11.
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payable under a formula that has unknowns in it, such as stock price or
earnings of the division, but the formula at least gives the promise of a
payout, determinable from objective criteria at a time certain. Unknowns
in the formula, however, will probably prevent the discount rate on de-
ferred compensation from dropping into the range of that on debt. Em-
ployees will probably never evaluate deferred compensation with a
negative after-tax discount rate that has applied to debt. Deferred com-
pensation, however, will reduce the discount rate used in the calculation
of present value, by cutting down on management opportunities for self-
serving future behavior at the expense of the recipient. Deferred com-
pensation has every promise of reducing the distrust about future man-
agement which creates such extraordinary discount rates with respect to
stock.
Reducing the discount applied to future cash by the employee would
have no effect on the return on investments that the employer uses to
fund future cash and to compute its current cost. A corporate employer
with an extraordinary 12% or 20% after-tax return rate on its invest-
ments has committed a fraction of that return by giving out stock. It can
use the same extraordinary rate on investments to fund future deferred
compensation, without necessarily committing cash payments that in-
crease at 12% or 20% per year over time. Switching from stock to cash
should increase the value of the compensation to the employees without
increasing the cost to the employer.
2. Rabbi Trusts
It is also possible to increase credibility of future management even
more by setting up what is known as a "rabbi trust." A rabbi trust is an
irrevocable commitment of funds for the benefit of the employee. The
employer can not reach the trust funds. The trust remains subject to the
claims of creditors of the employer and the employee has no preferred
claim in bankruptcy. The Internal Revenue Service will rule that the em-
ployee has no taxable compensation until the cash is paid out.72 A major
cause of the extraordinary discount rates on stock appears to be distrust
of opportunistic behavior by management in the future. The rabbi trust
cannot protect the employee from managers who drive the employer into
bankruptcy; but, if the employer does not go into bankruptcy, the rabbi
trust can ensure that there is a fund of money to pay the employee under
the deferred compensation plan. Another major cause of the extraordi-
nary discount rate on stock is volatility of the price of stock. A rabbi trust
can invest in low volatility or high volatility investments with unfettered
choice.
72. See Rev. Proc. 92-64, 1992-2 C.B. 422 (explaining that the I.R.S. will issue a ruling
that an employee does not have taxable income from a rabbi trust, provided the trust is
subject to claims of creditors and that it gives the employee no priority interest); Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 81-13-107 (Dec. 31, 1980) (holding that a synagogue could set up a trust for its rabbi
without the rabbi being taxed).
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Putting funds into a rabbi trust, however, would plausibly have a detri-
mental effect on the employer-side discount rate. Funding means that the
trust would have to invest in publicly available investments and publicly
available investments can be expected to give only an average rate of
return for the risk. Extraordinary returns are available to any corporate
employer only because capital is combined with entrepreneurial skill or
position. If funds are put into a rabbi trust by a corporation that can
make better than publicly available returns, the funds should plausibly be
re-lent out to the corporation for use in the business. A loan between a
rabbi trust and the employer is invisible for tax purposes, 73 but it affects a
real transfer of cash from outside the irrevocable trust. That destroys
part of the advantage of a rabbi trust, which is to have a safe cash fund
available to pay the future compensation. Perhaps, there is a net value in
a rabbi trust in reducing the employee discount rate without symmetri-
cally reducing the employer discount rate by as much, but there will un-
doubtedly be trade-offs between the two discount rates.
In any event, deferred compensation offers a very good chance of cor-
recting the major drawbacks of stock compensation. Stock plausibly has
a higher discount rate on the holders' side than on the issuers' side. De-
ferred compensation offers a good chance of having a lower discount rate
in the employee's evaluation of present value, while keeping a higher dis-
count rate for the employer.
C. TAXATION OF STOCK AND DEFERRED COMPENSATION 7 4
Stock is often touted as a means by which to deliver capital gain to the
employee. 75 Once the employee becomes the owner of stock, for exam-
ple, the employer may redeem it back at fair market value and give the
employee capital gain. 76 Capital gain on stock held for more than a year
is subject to tax of no more than 20%. 7 7
Capital gains plans, however, require that the employer give up the
deduction of the benefit of the gain. Ordinarily, the employer deduction
makes deferred compensation more valuable. Within a broad range, de-
ferred compensation deductible by the employer will deliver a larger
73. The trust will be taxed as a grantor trust within I.R.C. § 461, a deduction paid by a
grantor trust shall be treated as paid by the grantor itself. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-13-107
(Dec. 31, 1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.461-2(c) (1960).
74. This section relies on Calvin H. Johnson, Stock Compensation Under Section 83: A
Reassessment, S. CAL. TAX INST. 801.1-801.2 (1980). Model 2, herein, however is a
reworking of 801.2 relying on the work of Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Timing of Taxes, 39
NAT'L TAX J. 499, 501 (1986) and Daniel 1. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the "Time
Value of Money," 95 YALE L.J. 506 (1986).
75. See, e.g., SENATE FINANCE COMMITrEE, REVENUE ACT OF 1964, S. Rep. No. 830,
88th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1964) (explaining that the Congress continued incentive stock
option provisions giving capital gain to employees because incentives would be good for
specific companies and also for the economy as a whole).
76. See I.R.C. § 302(b) (1998) (providing that a redemption that is a complete termina-
tion of shareholder's interest or that reduces shareholder's fractional ownership by 20%
will qualify as in "sale or exchange").
77. See I.R.C. §§ 1(h)(1)(E), 1222(3), (11) (1998).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
amount of after-tax benefit to the employee than will transactions that
will give the employee capital gain.
This section develops two algebraic models of employee capital gain
and then discusses which is applicable under various circumstances and
what the models say about the advantages of cash plans versus stock
plans as a way to pay future cash.
1. Model 1: Appreciation Only
Ordinarily, an employer deduction for appreciation on stock is more
important than qualifying the appreciation as capital gain. Assume that a
corporation sells $1000 worth of its stock to a 44% tax rate employee for
its fair market value. The stock appreciates for 10 years to be worth
$11,000.78 The corporation redeems the stock, giving the employee a net
capital gain of $10,000.79 Naively, the employee is delighted to have that
gain taxed at capital gain rates. Had the gain been treated as compensa-
tion, the employee would have paid tax of 44% or $4400 and been left
with only $6400 after tax profit. As capital gain, the tax is 20%, and the
employee's after-tax profit is $8000.
The naive capital-gain position misses the benefit of the employer de-
duction that would have been available. An employer willing to devote
$10,000 net cash to the employee at the point of redemption of stock
without a deduction should be willing to devote a larger amount to the
employee if a deduction is available. A corporation in a 35% tax bracket
can "gross up" the amount paid, reflecting the compensation deduction,
to a larger pre-tax amount, at the same after-tax cost. The employer
could pay $10,000/(1-35%) or $15,385 to the employee. The deduction of
$15,385 would have saved 35%*$15,385 or $5,385, so that after tax, the
cost would be the same $10,000. The employee, however, gets $15,385 in
pre-tax cash. The employee tax is 44%*$15,385 or $6,769. The em-
ployee's after-tax benefit is $15,385-$6,769 or $8,615, that is, better than
the $8000 from the capital gain alternative.
Algebraically, the employee's after-tax position from the capital gain
plan and deductible compensation plan can be compared as follows:
(1) $10,000 [ (1-Tx) / ( 1-Tc ] versus $10,000 (1-cg) where Tx represents
the executive's tax rate, Tc represents the corporate employer's tax rate
and cg represents the capital gain tax.
At the values Tx = 44%, Tc = 35%, cg = 20%, comparison (1) became:
(1A) $10,000 [ (1-44%) / (1-35%) ] versus $10,000 (1-20%) or
(1B) $10,000 [ 86.15%] versus $10,000 (80%) or
78. The appreciation is 27% per year because $1000*(1 + 27%)" ° = $11,000.
79. To qualify as capital gain, the redemption must completely terminate the em-
ployee's shareholder interest or reduce the employee-shareholder's fractional interest by
more than 20% and leave her with less than 50% of the corporation's shares. See I.R.C.
§ 302(b)(2), (3) (1998). The 20% reduction test would always be easier to meet, except
that the complete termination test allows the employee to avoid constructive ownership of




(1C) $8,615 versus $8000.
The model in comparison (1) does not mean that capital gain is never
the better plan for the employee. To take a simple example, assume a
corporation with tax shelters and net operating losses extending so far
into the foreseeable future that the value of the compensation deduction
is zero or trivial. Without value to the compensation deduction, the com-
parison (1) breaks down to a simple statement that the employee is better
off with capital gains rates (cg) than with ordinary tax rates (Tx).
A more general rule can be derived from comparison (1). The $10,000
drops out of both sides of the comparison (1) leaving the rule that struc-
turing the employee's gain as deductible compensation rather than capital
gain will allow the employee to be better off after tax, whenever (1-Tx) / (
1-Tc > (1-cg). Stating the same relationship in a different way, the par-
ties would be better off going for ordinary compensation rather than capi-
tal gain, whenever the corporation's tax rate is high enough to satisfy the
following inequality:
(1D) Is Tc > 1- (1 -Tx)! (1-cg)?
For an employee in the highest tax bracket, the right side of the ine-
quality 1D is 1 - (1-44%)/(1-20%) or 1-(56%/80%) or 14%: corporations
with an effective tax rate of more than 14% when the stock is to be re-
deemed should abandon any capital gain plans for employees and switch
to deferred compensation instead.
Model 2, as discussed next, implies that deferred compensation is bet-
ter for the employee than capital gains plans without regard to the rela-
tive size of the employer's tax deductions.
2. Model 2: Nullification of Capital Gain
When capital arises on property given to the employee as compensa-
tion, capital gains plans are always worse than comparable cash plans that
give the employer a deduction, at least within the scope of the assumption
that tax rates remain constant. Deferring the employee's deduction until
the cash is paid, gives the employee a benefit that is as good as not paying
any tax on the subsequent capital gain. The employee should prefer the
effectively-no-capital-gain tax position from deferred compensation to a
plan that requires the employee to pay some positive capital gain.
Assume, for instance, that the $1000 worth of stock was not sold to the
employee (as in Model 1), but rather transferred to the employee as com-
pensation. Assume now that the stock grows by growth rate g over pe-
riod n by ten times so that the stock is worth $10,00080 and the employer
redeems the stock back for its $10,000 fair market value. In absence of
tax, the employee would get $10,000 in cash at the end of the period.
Stock compensation is deductible to the employee when paid, so the
employer could gross up the compensation to an amount larger than the
80. What rate of growth g the $10,000 represents depends upon what period n is al-
lowed for growth. At n = 10, for example, the growth is 26% per year.
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$1000 pre-tax value when the stock was initially transferred, with the
same after tax cost. Assume the employer grosses up the compensation
with more stock to $1000/(1-Tc)-treating stock worth $1 and real cash of
$1 as equivalents. The executive would pay tax of Tx on the grossed-up
compensation. If we assume executive tax is paid by selling the compen-
satory stock itself, the employee has $1000 *[(1-Tx )I(1-Tc)] of the invest-
ment remaining after tax.
Assume again that the stock grows at rate g to (1+g)" or ten times the
original value. The employer could redeem the stock for the appreciated
fair market value, giving the employee capital gain taxable at lower capi-
tal gain rate cg. Taxable capital gain is computed by subtracting the em-
ployee's basis from the amount realized. Algebraically, the employee's
after-tax terminal position is:
(2) $1000 *[(1-Tx)/(1-Tc)] : (i+g)n _ cg * {$1000 *[(1-Tx)I(1-Tc)] *(1+g)" -$1000" *[(1-Tx)1(1.Tc)]}
The highlighted terms in Expression (2) represent capital gain tax on
gain from the redemption of the stock. With values of Tx = 44%, Tc =
35%, (1+i)" = 10, and cg = 20%, expression (2) becomes:
(2B) $1000 * [56%/65%] * 10 - 20% { $1000*[56%165%]*9 } =
(2C) $8615 - 20% {$862*9} = $8615 - $1551 = $7,064. The capital
gains tax highlighted in (2B-2C) reduced the employees after tax benefit
by $1551.
Deferred Compensation
The entire impact of capital gains tax on the employee can be elimi-
nated if the plan had only been a plan for deferred payment. In absence
of tax, the transaction is $1000 initial value of stock redeemed back for
$10,000 cash. If there is no initial transfer of stock, then there would be
no deduction for income that would change the initial $1000. When the
employer pays $10,000 in cash, however, there is both a deduction and
income. An employer willing to pay $10,000 in absence of tax upon re-
demption, should be willing to gross up the payment by 1/(1-Tc) to
$15,384. The executive receiving the $15,384 would pay tax at 44% leav-
ing $15,384 * (1-Tx) or $8,615. That after tax $8,615 is exactly the same as
(2C) as if there were no capital gains tax! The capital gains tax has been
effectively nullified by delaying the compensation event until the em-
ployee needs the cash.
Algebraically, the nullification of the capital gain tax, by shift to cash
compensation, can be expressed as:
(3A) $1000 * (1+g)n * [(1-Tx)I(1-Tc)]
The terms of Expression (3A) can be rearranged:
(3) $1000 *[(1-Tx )I(1-Tc)] * (1+g)"
Expression (3), describing the after tax position with deferred compen-
sation, is exactly like Expression (2), except that there is no capital gain.
Expression (3) is equivalent to Expression (2) without a capital gain tax,
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regardless of the values of ordinary income tax, employer tax, growth rate
or time, or capital gains rates, so long as the values for Tx and Tc remain
the same.
Expression (3), showing nullification of capital gain, is a variation of
the Cary Brown thesis, which says that deferring tax on capital effectively
lifts the tax on the subsequent income.8' Expression (3) applies not just if
the employee is paid in stock, but also if the employee is paid in cash and
buys stock. Employee capital gain is accordingly, not good tax planning
and employee capital gain is no justification for stock over deferred
compensation.
Expression (3) does assume that the corporate and individual tax rates
are the same between the period when stock is awarded and the period
when cash is paid. Sometimes the executives tax rate will be low when
stock is awarded or the corporation's tax rate will be high. Under those
circumstances, Expression (2) capital gain might be better than Expres-
sion (3) deferred compensation. The usual start-up company, however,
goes from zero tax, when it has high development costs,82 into a higher
tax once the products are successful. In that case, the deduction for de-
ferred compensation will be much more valuable.
An employee can avoid capital gain tax included in the Expression (2)
description by dying.83 If there is no capital gain tax in Expression (2),
then Expression (3) for deferred compensation, effectively eliminating
capital gain tax, is not an advantage. Still, Expression (3) does mean that
deferred compensation gives the benefit of no capital gain tax without the
executive having to die to get it.
Under Model 1, deferred compensation is better than capital gain plans
only if Tc > (1-Tx)/(1-cg), whereas Model 2 shows that deferred compen-
sation is better than employee capital gain without regard to values for
Tc, Tx and cg. Looking only at capital gain appreciation, Expression (3)
and Model 2 are more comprehensive descriptions of stock and deferred
compensation than Model 1, because Model 2 shows the taxation of the
capital that causes the capital gain appreciation. It is, thus, tempting to
say that Model 2 is always superior to Model 1. As a matter of positive
law, however, employees can get eligibility for capital gain, without hav-
ing to pay tax on the capital that is appreciating. Employees can, for
instance, be given an option to buy stock, and the appreciation on the
stock long before they put any capital in, will nonetheless qualify as capi-
tal gain to the employee. 84 Model 2 applies to what might be called "nat-
81. See, e.g., E. Cary Brown, Business-Income Taxation and Investment Incentives, in
Income, Employment and Public Policy: Essays in Honor of Alvin H. Hansen 300 (1948);
DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 123-24 (1977); Stanley S.
Surrey, The Tax Reform Act of 1969 -Tax Deferral and Tax Shelters, 12 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 307 (1971).
82. I.R.C. § 174 (1998) allows the deduction of research or experimental costs when
incurred.
83. See I.R.C. § 1014 (1998).
84. See I.R.C. §§ 421, 422 (1998).
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ural" or "normal" capital gain arising because of the appreciation of
employee post-tax investment. Model 1, then, applies to employee capi-
tal gain that might be called abnormal or artificial employee capital gain.
Model 1, however, says that even if the capital gain is forced or artificial
for the employee, employee capital gain is not usually optimal tax
planning.
IV. A NOTE ON COMPARING STOCK COMPENSATION WITH
CURRENT CASH
The primary focus of this article has been on comparing stock compen-
sation with other ways to pay future cash. It has been assumed, as a juris-
dictional fact, that current cash is not available to pay employees. Many
start-up companies are so cash starved that they at least have the percep-
tion that use of cash is not a viable alternative. Nonetheless, some note
should be taken of when stock compensation is superior to the use of
current cash.
A corporation that makes an extraordinary return on invested cash
might well be tempted to conserve its cash and use stock to pay employ-
ees instead. If internal investment generates a 12% compound return af-
ter inflation and taxes, then $1000 will grow to $3.5 million, in constant-
value terms, after seventy-two years.85 The corporation might well be-
lieve it will make $3.5 million at the end of the stock redemption period
by using a $1000 stock bonus instead of $1000 cash. The difficulty with
the argument is that by giving the employee the $1000 stock, the corpora-
tion has committed to the employee all of the $3.5 million cash that the
corporation will make by using the $1000 cash. The historical sharehold-
ers get no advantage from using stock instead of cash because stock gives
to the employee the after-tax cash that the corporation makes by with-
holding the immediate cash bonus.
There is a range in which the historical shareholders can profit by a
switch from current cash to stock compensation. A corporation that
beats its own track record, reflected in its stock price, on new investments
can increase the average return on stock. If the corporation uses the dis-
count rate on its own stock as a base line from which to judge its own
investments, then it will go into those investments that improve its net
worth overall. The return made on new high-rate-of-return investments
will then be shared between historical shareholders and the new share-
holder-employees. Stated another way, a corporation that can get a
higher return on its investments than is reflected in its own stock price
will be able to fund the future cash distribution on its stock at a present
value cost of less than the price of the stock. By contrast, if the return on
the new investment is less than the return on its old investments, the cor-
poration will be sharing more with the new shareholder-employees than




it gets from the investment of the $1000 withheld from the employee and
replaced with stock. The standard for choice of stock versus current cash
compensation is just a variation of the more general standard, first ex-
pressed by Irving Fisher, that a corporation should use the discount rate
on its own stock as a base line in evaluating its investment opportuni-
ties.86 A corporation should distribute cash as dividends if it cannot find
investments that give a return higher than the return reflected in the price
of its own stock and so similarly a corporation should use cash instead of
its own stock, if it cannot find investments that give a return higher than
the return reflected by its own stock.
A corporation with access to high return investments should also be
switching from current cash to future cash to pay employees, to the extent
that employees will tolerate it. When the corporation switches to future
cash, however, it should be using the optimal format to pay the future
cash and stock is the least optimal way to pay future cash. The conclusion
of this article is that the after-tax discount rates used by the market and
executives to evaluate debt or deferred compensation are lower than the
discount rate the corporation faces with stock. That means that the cor-
poration should be using the lower discount rates from debt or deferred
compensation as a standard to determine whether to pay current or de-
ferred cash. If a corporation truly faces a negative after-tax and after-
inflation interest rate on its debt, for example, as has occurred on average
over long periods of time, then the corporation needs to defer all cash
compensation to the future because the deferral makes the compensation
cheaper. So long as the employer can make some positive-value use of its
investable cash, compensation through negative-interest debt will leave
the corporation ahead in net worth, judging from the negative interest
rates available to corporations on average over the long term.
A corporation with attractive investments and an optimistic future can
also use deferred compensation to take advantage of an asymmetry of
discount rates that runs in favor of the corporation. Assume, for instance,
that a corporation makes 12% after tax and after inflation, but general
interest rates on secure promises are only 4% after tax. The corporation
rewards an executive with $1 million cash bonus, payable in ten years. To
the corporate employer, the $1 million payable to the executive has a
present value cost of only $322,000 given the 12 percent discount rate.87
Assume the executive views the future cash with only a 4% after-tax dis-
count rate, however. At that discount rate, the $1 million cash bonus will
have a present value of $675,000.88 The corporation is more than doub-
ling the bang for its buck by taking advantage of the difference between
its discount rate used to fund the bonus, and the lower discount rate the
86. See e.g., Miller & Rock, supra note 51, at 1032; COPELAND & WESTON, supra note
6, at 18 (explaining the Irving Fisher criterion that corporations need to distribute earnings
if projects available to it give a return less than the rate of return on the corporation's own
stock).
87. $1,000,000/(1 + 12%10 = $321,973.
88. $1,000,000/(1 + 4%) 0 = $675,564.
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employee has access to. The difficulty that makes stock compensation so
expensive is an asymmetry caused by tax and asymmetrical information
that causes the employee to discount the cash at a much higher rate than
the rate at which the corporation bears the cost of the cash. Once that
diagnosis is understood, then the corporation can search for opportunities
to reverse the asymmetry and pay by a method that is cheap to the corpo-
ration but valuable to the employee.
V. CONCLUSION
Stock compensation is an expensive means to compensate employees.
Employer debt is cheaper because the discount rate used to evaluate the
present value of the future cash is lower on debt than on stock, and be-
cause interest on debt is deductible. Deferred compensation is better
than stock because the discount rate is lower and because deferred com-
pensation is a more flexible way to give managers appropriate incentives.
Deferred compensation, moreover, ordinarily gives the employee better
benefits after tax than does employee capital gain.
